As researchers who study topics at the interface between self and emotion, we are often frustrated by the lack of integration and interconnection between the two areas. Prevailing views on emotion frequently neglect important self-evaluative processes or fail to do justice to the complexity of these processes; and research and theory on the self is dominated by a simple dichotomy between positive and negative affect, when emotions such as pride and shame seem so central to many important self-processes. These dual frustrations motivated us to develop the theoretical model presented in our target article, which represents our attempt to "put the self into self-conscious emotions." Our goal was to summarize what the field knows about self-conscious emotions and related self-processes, and organize this research into a coherent, explanatory framework. In this response, we (a) explain why we believe a process model of self-conscious emotions is essential for the field to progress, (b) address some of the concerns raised by the commentators about the role of the self in the emotion-elicitation process, and (c) suggest topics for future research inspired by the commentaries and our model.
Why the Field Needs a Process Model of Self-Conscious Emotions
Reading the commentaries made it clear to us that the field needs a formal model to guide research in this area. The wide range of definitions, examples, and conceptualizations presented in the commentaries point to the need for a comprehensive, integrative framework. Many of the commentators expressed strong assertions about the nature of self-conscious emotions, however many of these assertions were inconsistent with each other and/or previous research and theory. In our view, the best way to reconcile these disparities is to derive predictions from a formal model of the underlying process, and then empirically test these predictions.
A process model of self-conscious emotions can help move the field beyond intuitive definitions of emotions by defining them in terms of underlying (and presumably universal) processes. In addition, a process model can help account for individual and cultural differences in emotional experiences. If emotions are defined in terms of processes, questions about individual differences need not be about whether the emotion is the same or different, experienced or not experienced, or important or not important in different individuals or cultures, but rather whether (and how) the underlying process varies, promoting a more explanatory and less descriptive approach.
In the target article, we used narcissism as an example of how an important individual-difference variable could be usefully conceptualized within the framework of our model. In their commentary, Campbell, Foster, and Brunell question several of the hypotheses generated by our model, arguing that the main component of the narcissistic personality is not a sense of inadequacy and shame, as we suggest, but rather a tendency to emphasize agentic over communal identity goals, which leads narcissists to "respond to threats by trying to knock the threatener down a peg or two." Although we view narcissists' anger as an outcome of their chronic tendency to regulate feelings of shame, we believe that this ongoing debate (see Campbell, 2001; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Robins, Tracy, & Shaver, 2001 ) can be best addressed from the perspective of a process model. Specifically, by considering how each link in the model may differ for narcissists and non-narcissists, the model generates competing hypotheses that pit our own and Campbell et al.'s views against each other. If narcissists' anger is the result of regulated shame, as we predict, they should make internal, stable, global attributions for negative events, at least at an implicit level. We agree with Campbell and his colleagues that, at present, there is
not enough evidence to reach a clear-cut conclusion, so this is an important direction for future research. An additional benefit of a process model is that it suggests possible interventions. Kemeny, Gruenewald, and Dickerson report evidence that shame has a negative impact on health. Using our model to guide interventions, researchers might design programs to help individuals change their chronic appraisal patterns. Specifically, we might want to teach shame-prone individuals to attribute negative events to internal, unstable, specific causes, to feel the more psychologically adaptive emotion of guilt instead of shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) .
Thus, we believe that the field would benefit from adopting a process model of self-conscious emotions, and that our model is a reasonable starting point. However, several commentators (Gasper & Robinson; Parrott) question whether our model meaningfully extends existing appraisal theories, in particular those of Lazarus, Roseman, and Weiner. 1 Certainly, our model did not arise de novo. The fact that our model builds on previous theories is one of its strengths: Any model that is not closely tied to existing theories would almost necessarily be wrong because it would imply that all previous theories were not even on the right track. Our goal was to take the various theoretical strands appearing in a range of appraisal theories and weave them together with ideas and findings from the self literature. The result, in our view, is a novel theoretical integration, and one that is specifically tailored to an understanding of self-conscious emotions as a special class.
As Parrott notes, previous appraisal-based theories of emotion "tend to slight the social nature of self-conscious emotions" (this issue), and thus do not do justice to the complex set of self-evaluative processes that underlie self-conscious emotions. Our model, in contrast, integrates disparate ideas from research on self-awareness, self-focused attention, identity and self-representations (including personal, relational, social, and collective selves), cybernetic models of self-regulation, self-discrepancy theory, self and other attributions, and appraisal theory to produce a single explanatory framework for the self-conscious emotion-eliciting process. The considerable disagreement among the commentators about how we should conceptualize self-conscious emotions points to the need for further theorizing, and to the inability of previous theories to fully capture the self-conscious emotion process. Clearly, whatever theoretical work has been done has not led to any resolution of these complex issues.
What Exactly Is the Role of the Self in the Self-Conscious Emotion Process?
Although the commentators seem favorably disposed toward our attempt to put the self into self-conscious emotions, they raise a number of issues that suggest the need for additional theorizing. Of note, several of the critiques seem to be triggered by a general problem we encountered when developing our model: The self-conscious emotion process seems to involve virtually every self-related process ever studied. As a result, the literature relevant to our model is immense, and we necessarily lost some of its complexity when we pared it down to the limited number of boxes in our process model. In actuality, each appraisal in our model might require its own process model. For example, appraisals of identity-goal congruence involve many of the processes discussed in Carver and Scheier's (1998) self-regulation model (e.g., the comparator), and the attentional focus box in the model subsumes a large literature on self-awareness and self-focused attention. Thus, to some extent the self-processes described by our model simplify the processes that actually occur. As a consequence, several commentators raised questions about the precise role of the self and, in particular, argued that the self we put into self-conscious emotions was not social enough.
Identity Goals Involve the Personal, Social, Relational, or Collective Self As several commentators point out, we generally focused on aspects of the personal self when discussing our model. Although we noted that identity goals and self-representations may involve the personal, social, relational, and/or collective self, we neglected to articulate in detail the fact that a central part of a person's identity is the social self-his or her reputation, feelings of social acceptance and status, and so on. We did not describe all of the complexities involved in each process but rather assumed that these processes occur in a manner consistent with the consensual theorizing in the literature. The literature on the self has long embraced the idea that the self is a fundamentally social construct, and virtually every major theorist-James, J. M. Baldwin, Cooley, Mead, and most 
contemporary researchers (including many of the commentators; see also Tyler, Kramer, & John, 1999 )-has adopted this perspective. We do not see our model as in any way incompatible with this view, or with the views of commentators who argue for the importance of nonpersonal self-representations and collective aspects of identity. To clarify, in our view, self-representations reflect the perceptions of significant others (Cooley, 1902) and the generalized other (Mead, 1934) and thus constitute internalizations of social feedback, social norms, and so on. We are social creatures so our self-representations reflect the culture that has socialized us. Self-representations and corresponding goals for one's identity are highly socialized-a large part of who we are is based on who our society tells us we should be. In cultures where people are socialized to view the self in a broader, collective sense, self-representations will be much more collective, and correspondingly, appraisals of identity-goal relevance and congruence will depend to a greater extent on events' relevance and congruence to these collective representations.
Putting the Social Into Self-Conscious Emotions
These commentators raise two general issues related to the social nature of self-conscious emotions. First, Baldwin and Bacchus argue that self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride occur only when an interpersonal aspect of one's identity is threatened (or elevated)-that is, when people feel excluded or rejected (vs. included and accepted) by others. In contrast, we argue that the identity goals that drive self-conscious emotions need not be interpersonal-they can involve task-oriented (i.e., achievement) goals. For example, a researcher who works hard to discover a new finding will likely achieve the identity goal of being a good scientist and consequently feel pride. Although achieving this goal may ultimately benefit the researcher's level of acceptance in his or her peer group, we see no basis for the claim that the researcher will only feel pride if this is the case. Our model predicts that the researcher will appraise the event as identity-goal congruent and feel pride in response even if no one else ever knows about the success. Although we may well have evolved to feel pride in such situations because the emotion reinforces behaviors that ultimately promote social acceptance, the proximal cause (i.e., cognitive antecedents) of this pride experience may well be the perception that one has reached some internal standard of excellence.
Second, Kemeny and her colleagues argue that self-conscious emotions are only elicited if a person's social status or acceptance is threatened in the presence of an audience. Although we do not downplay the importance of public threats as potential elicitors of self-conscious emotions, we believe that self-conscious emotions can occur in the absence of public threats. Kemeny et al. present strong evidence showing that social-evaluative threats lead to shame, however these findings do not preclude the possibility that shame can also occur in the absence of social threat, when there is no evaluative audience present. In fact, there is abundant evidence that self-conscious emotions occur when people are alone (e.g., Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996) . One could argue, as Leary did in his commentary, that an imagined audience is present in these circumstances, but it would be quite a broad claim to assume that every time someone is ashamed of his or her score on an exam, the way he or she looks, or of a cruel thought he or she had, the shame is due to the presence of an imagined audience. It seems more likely that an imagined other exists at an unconscious level, but when we begin to think of the observing "other" as unconscious, the concept becomes difficult to disentangle from activation of an ideal self-representation. In fact, it seems impossible to imagine an evaluative audience without activating actual, ideal, and/or ought self-representations. The real presence of an evaluating other may be necessary for the initial early development of self-representations, however when these representations are fully internalized they can be activated when individuals are alone.
Thus far we have discussed the processes that directly elicit self-conscious emotions. We think it is important to distinguish these processes from the broader function of self-conscious emotions, which were conflated in some of the commentaries. We restate our belief that, although the eliciting processes may or may not be directly social in nature, self-conscious emotions exist to serve social functions. Self-conscious emotions help us thrive in a social world where attaining status and acceptance is essential to our ability to survive and reproduce. This is also the reason we have a self, or identity; in addition, in our view, self-conscious emotions evolved to help us enhance and protect this identity. Thus, if we examine self-conscious emotions at the level of basic motives, we ultimately return to issues of social status (getting ahead) and social acceptance (getting along). Several commentators (Baldwin & Bacchus, Leary) focus on social acceptance, others (Gilbert) on social status, and others (Kemeny et al.) on both. We agree that both motives are central to the functions (and consequently the elicitors) of self-conscious emotions; that, as Kemeny et al. (this issue) eloquently state, emotions such as shame and pride "may be one way that individuals feel their place in the social hierarchy."
However, we need not infer that the direct internal cognitive elicitors of self-conscious emotions parallel their essential social functions. One's identity and its accompanying self-representations capture what it
means to be a social being, and self-conscious emotions are experienced when this identity is threatened or elevated-which can occur independently of interpersonal situations. Thus, in searching for the cognitive elicitors of self-conscious emotions, we need not restrict our gaze to the strictly social elements of the self-our entire identity can be viewed as a microcosm of the social world within the self. The key question is not whether social goals are at stake, but whether identity goals are at stake. These identity goals can be interpersonal or task focused, public or private, but, most important, must be about the aspirations and ideals (as well as the fears) of the self. By emphasizing identity, our model considers the potentially private nature of these emotions-the fact that they can occur in response to events of which only the self is aware.
A Broader Conceptualization of Internal Attribution
Several commentators (Camras & Fatani; Leary; Mesquita & Karasawa) take issue with our assertion that self-conscious emotions require internal attributions, assuming that in our model the personal self must be directly responsible for the eliciting event. However, we take a broad view of what it means to make an internal attribution. Rather than conceptualize this appraisal in the narrow sense of attribution theory (e.g., "Did I cause the event?"), we conceptualize it in the more general sense of, "Is something about me or related to me the cause of the event?" If "me" is broadly defined to include all aspects of one's identity, then this throws new light on some of the examples provided by the commentators. We have many selves, but only one of them needs to have caused the event.
One example of this complexity can be seen in an issue Camras and Fatani raise, suggesting that in nonWestern cultures an individual might feel shame following her sister's failure. In this case, we suggest that the more specific meaning of internal attribution does not come into play. The self is the cause of the event, but not the individual self; rather it is the collective self, which, as we note (this issue), can be an important elicitor of self-conscious emotions. Consistent with Camras and Fatani's example, Mesquita and Karasawa argue that the collective self is a more central elicitor of emotion in non-Western than Western cultures. This possibility points to an important direction for future research and provides a good example of how the underlying process (internal attributions) can be the same across cultures even when the particular self-representations and identity-goals that are activated tend to vary.
A second example of the complexity of internal attributions, raised by Gasper and Robinson raises, concerns situations where the individual is the accidental or unwilling recipient of someone else's social faux pas, such as the oft-cited recipient of spilled soup at a dinner party. This individual would likely experience a self-conscious emotion, such as embarrassment, even though he is not the intentional cause of the event, because something about him (his messy, soupy state, which is no doubt inconsistent with his ideal social self-representations) is the cause of the awkward social situation.
A third example concerns vicarious self-conscious emotions, which, as we note in our target article, seem to be contradictory to our model (Footnote 13). However, in our view, these emotions, such as when people "bask in the reflected glory of those who have excelled" (Leary, this issue) or become embarrassed after watching another's social mistake (Beer & Keltner; Camras & Fatani), result from the activation of personal, relational, social, and collective self-representations and corresponding identity goals. A person who feels pride in another's success could experience this emotion because (a) he or she takes direct credit for the outcome (personal self); (b) he or she includes the other within his or her self-representations, as would an observer of the Olympics for a winner from his or her country (collective self), or a proud parent observing a child's success (relational self); or (c) he or she has an empathic response toward the individual (e.g., "That could have been me"), which could occur even when the two people have no prior psychological connection (personal self).
A final issue relevant to the complexity of internal attributions concerns our claim that basic emotions require external attributions. Gasper and Robinson argue against this claim, noting that sadness, for example, can occur without external blame, and that happiness can result from internal attributions. We agree that an individual may feel happy after getting a good grade on an exam, even if he or she makes an internal attribution for the success, however we think it likely that the resultant joy would be combined with pride. In the case of negative emotions, if the cause of one's sadness is internal (e.g., forgot to bring the cat in at night) rather than external (e.g., a car hit the cat when it ran outside), the individual will likely will feel sadness and guilt (or shame). From the perspective of our model, these dual emotions occur because the appraisal of identity-goal congruence or incongruence generates positive or negative affect irrespective of further appraisals, and the subsequent internal attributions produce co-occurring self-conscious emotions. It is also possible that the basic emotions co-occurring in such cases are better conceptualized as generalized positive/negative affect (e.g., pleasure/displeasure) than discrete basic emotions (e.g., happiness/anger). Perhaps the identity-goal congruence appraisal automatically elicits such generalized affect, and the subsequent locus attribution determines whether a self-conscious or basic discrete emotion co-occurs.
D o N o t C o p y
Perhaps it is the generalized affect that gives the corresponding discrete emotion its hedonic/anhedonic tone. If future research supports this hypothesis, it may suggest an important modification of our model.
Self-Conscious Emotions Cannot Occur in the Absence of Complex Self-Evaluative Processes
Several commentators (Gasper & Robinson; Kemeny et al; Leary) argue that self-conscious emotions can be elicited in the absence of complex self-evaluative processes-that social evaluation in and of itself can produce feelings of pride and shame. For example, Kemeny et al. (this issue) assert that shame results from "a simple appraisal of low status or a salient drop in status." In our view, this appraisal is not so simple, and one goal of our model was to unpack the mediating self-evaluative components. To perceive a status drop, an individual must be aware of his or her current status (stable self-representations), perceive an external event as relevant to these self-representations, and evaluate the event as discrepant with the self-representation. This minimalist set of appraisals is already fairly complex, and to feel shame the individual must further attribute the event to the internal, stable, global self.
In fact, social evaluation will not elicit self-conscious emotions if the evaluated individual does not make the relevant self-evaluative appraisals. For example, positive evaluations will not produce pride in individuals who discount the evaluations (e.g., if they have low self-esteem), and negative evaluations will not produce shame if they pertain to non-self-relevant domains (e.g., a person is unlikely to feel shame about a poor performance in the cooking class he is attending for the sake of his partner). Furthermore, if one's drop in status is caused by someone else (e.g., an individual loses his or job because of a clerical mistake), the response will likely be anger and not shame. Thus, based on decades of research on the self, we argue that negative social evaluations or a drop in status elicit shame because they activate a host of self-evaluative processes, and these are precisely the processes described by our model. In accordance with mainstream views in the literature (e.g., Lewis, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) , we believe that self-evaluative processes necessarily mediate the relation between social evaluation and self-conscious emotions. 2
Is There Really Anything Special About Self-Conscious Emotions?
One implication of our theoretical stance that self-conscious emotions require complex self-evaluative processes is that they are psychologically distinct from basic emotions. Several of the commentators questioned this assumption, arguing that self-conscious emotions are not so different from basic emotions (Beer & Keltner) , that the classification of basic versus self-conscious is itself flawed (Gasper & Robinson) , and that at least one self-conscious emotion, shame, merits consideration as a basic emotion (Kemeny et al.) . In the target article, we took a strong stance that self-conscious emotions have a number of distinctive features that make it important to distinguish them from basic emotions.
Kemeny et al. propose an interesting solution to the controversy: It may be better to think of emotions as varying on a continuum from basic to self-conscious, rather than as existing in one of two discrete classes. For the most part, we agree with this suggestion. In our view, basic and self-conscious emotions may be best conceptualized as fuzzy categories, with each emotion varying in the extent to which it is a good or bad exemplar of each category. From this perspective, shame and pride may be particularly good exemplars of the self-conscious emotion category, and also fairly good exemplars of the basic emotion category. In other words, we are persuaded by Kemeny et al.'s case for why shame might be a good exemplar of the basic emotion category, but we do not believe this makes it a bad exemplar of the self-conscious emotion category. Shame and pride are highly prototypical of the self-conscious emotion category because they require self-representations and self-awareness, emerge later in development, do not have nonverbal expressions that can be recognized from the face alone, and are cognitively complex.
The fuzzy category conceptualization may provide a useful framework for discussing research showing similarities and differences between self-conscious and basic emotions. For example, we argued in the target article that self-conscious emotions differ from basic emotions in their nonverbal expressions. Beer and Keltner agree that self-conscious emotion expressions, unlike basic emotion expressions, do not reside entirely within the face, but they argue that self-conscious emotion expressions show other basic-emotion characteristics: brief duration and high recognizability. We now agree with this assertion, and our recent research on the pride expression provides empirical support. We found that the pride expression can be recognized as quickly (within 750 ms; Tracy & Robins, 2004a) and as well (average recognition rates range from 75 to 90%; Tracy & Robins, 2004b) as most basic emotion expressions. We also have found
that children can recognize the pride expression by the age of 4 years-the same age at which they have been found to recognize the basic emotions (Tracy, Robins, & Lagattuta, 2004) . Despite these similarities with basic emotions, the question remains-why are basic emotions expressed in the face, whereas at least three self-conscious emotions (shame, embarrassment, and pride) clearly require nonfacial elements? To us, this is a very noteworthy distinction, and further examining it may help us understand how and why self-conscious emotions evolved. By conceptualizing the two kinds of emotions as fuzzy categories rather than discrete classes, we can avoid debates about whether a particular emotion is basic or self-conscious, and begin to explore the phylogenetic reasons these categories exist. Perhaps the degree to which an emotion is a good exemplar of each category reveals something important about when and why it evolved.
Testing the Model: An Agenda For Future Research
Gasper and Robinson argue that our model is not fully testable because a number of the processes may occur implicitly and bidirectionally. In contrast, Gilbert labels our model "testable," Beer and Keltner label it "generative," and Parrott call our predictions "useful for guiding research." Although we tend to agree with the latter set of commentators, we acknowledge that certain elements of our model may be difficult to test until reliable measures of implicit processes are developed. However, we feel strongly that researchers must not restrict their theorizing to topics they can currently measure; only when a particular technology becomes needed is it actually developed. Furthermore, the nonimplicit elements of our model can and are being tested now; we recently tested our predictions about the links between attributions and self-conscious emotions by measuring and manipulating appraisals and emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2002) . We found evidence supporting several of the links in our model, and the fact that the findings could have gone the other way (e.g., internal, unstable attributions might have been positively instead of negatively related to shame) demonstrates its falsifiability.
In our target article, we formulated predictions that emerged from each section of our model. Most of these predictions had some empirical support, but our hope was that they would serve to guide future research. Reading the commentaries was informative about the importance of this goal-the area of self-conscious emotion research is clearly a wide-open frontier.
One direction for future research would be to use measures such as the Implicit Associations Test to examine unconscious appraisals and even the unconscious regulation of emotions (e.g., implicit shame in narcissists). In a related vein, Kemeny et al. and Beer and Keltner question the degree of cognitive activity required for each self-conscious emotion; our model proposes specific predictions on this issue (e.g., embarrassment should be elicited from fewer cognitive appraisals than shame). These predictions can be tested using a variety of methods, including assessment of self-reported appraisals, manipulating appraisals, assessing reaction times to embarrassment-versus shame-eliciting events, and, as Gilbert suggests, assessing cortical activity.
Campbell and his colleagues seem enthusiastic about the prospects for studies guided by our model, and they suggested several important research questions: "Do individuals who receive success feedback and make internal attributions display a bodily posture indicative of pride? If they are made self-aware, does this show itself as hubristic pride? Would having a participant boast about global positive (or negative) self views (or simply to adopt the relevant body postures) lead to them being more violent after an ego threat?" (this issue). We are excited by all of these avenues for research.
Other commentators point to future research that does not directly test our model but that nonetheless may benefit from it. First, Kemeny et al.'s work on the physiological concomitants of shame point to a wide range of research directions. These commentators note their findings of higher cortisol levels following uncontrollable attributions, which are conceptually linked to attributions of stability. We have found that uncontrollable and stable attributions promote shame and distinguish it from guilt, so long as these attributions are also internal (Tracy & Robins, 2002) . Important future studies could examine whether the cortisol response occurs when attributions are uncontrollable but external; based on our model, this appraisal pattern would lead to anger but not shame, so an absence of the cortisol response would suggest a unique relation between cortisol and shame.
We are similarly excited by Kemeny et al's findings on the long-term health impact of shame; much similar to the research linking the Type A personality to heart disease, evidence linking shame to immune system diseases should become an important part of basic health education. By delineating the cognitive antecedents of shame, our model has important implications for interventions.
A second area that would benefit from using our model as an explanatory framework is research on emotional development. Camras and Fatani note that children seem not to distinguish among the various self-conscious emotions until the age of 8 years. Our model proposes several pathways that could account for this finding: For example, young children may not be capable of making internal attributions, or their D o N o t C o p y identity goals may not be fully formed, or they may not yet have internalized sufficiently abstract self-representations (e.g., ideal self-representations).
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, we are pleased that the commentators generally agree that the self plays an important role in the self-conscious emotion process, although the exact nature of that role is not resolved and remains an exciting topic for future research. With research on the self rapidly expanding, and affective science at the forefront of psychology, the time is ripe to devote greater attention to self-conscious emotions. The literature on self-conscious emotions is still in its infancy, and it needs an overarching, integrative model to provide structure and direction to the field. We proposed our model as a starting point, and we hope that, with the reformulations and extensions discussed in the commentaries and in this response, the field will make progress toward a consensual model that can provide a foundation for a cumulative science of self-conscious emotions. 
